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FAILURE OF COMMENCEMENT,
THE FORGOTTEN DEFENSE -
A COMMENT ON OHIO CIVIL RULE 3(A)
by
VIRGINIA L. SCIGLIANO*
I. INTRODUCTION
In applying Ohio's Rules of Civil Procedure this court has labored under
a belief that they were designed to facilitate the administration of substantial
justice in permitting the judiciary to resolve the merits of the controver-
sies presented to them rather than to prevent such resolution by the
hypertechnical application of procedural rules and statutes which can pro-
bably only be mastered by those members of the legal profession who
occupy its top 1 % in intellectual agility.1
T HE SIMPLICITY OF THE wording of Ohio's Rule 3(A) for commencement of a
law suit disguises the complexitites that are involved in the interpreta-
tion and use of the rule. The basis for these complexities are found in the 129
years of history of the rule and the interpretations given to the rule that extend
beyond the mere language of the rule.
This article will provide an in depth analysis of Rule 3(A). The analysis
is divided into four sections. The first section examines the historical develop-
ment of Rule 3(A) and the problems that developed and exist today. Section
two discusses the meanings and specific interpretations given to the language
of the rule. The unstated prerequisites of existence and capacity are analyzed
in section three. And, in section four, Rule 3(A)'s forgotten defense is discussed
and a model is developed for using the defense of failure to commence.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE RELATION BACK DOCTRINE
To become a civil action a lawsuit must come into existence at some point
in time.2 That point in time is considered to be the moment of commencement.3
*Ph.D., University of Texas at Austin; President of CHEMISTRE.
'Hayden v. Ours, 44 Ohio Misc. 62, 377 N.E.2d 182, 186 (C.P. Paulding County 1975).
2Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285, 288 (1954). In Kossuth the injuries resulted from
an automobile accident. The petition was filed timely but a summons was not issued. As specified in OHIO
REv. CODE ANN., § 2305.17 commencement, or existence, is the date of the service of the summons.
Therefore, the action did not come into existence, since a summons was not served.
'Browne, Ohio Civil Rule 8(C) and Related Rules, CLEVELAND STATE L. REv. 331, 362 (1978). Browne
notes that in Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285 (1954) "where there is a failure of
commencement no action even comes into existence." Id. An action is in existence when it is commenced.
[265]
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Basically the moment of commencement can be determined in two ways: the
moment in time when the initiating document4 is filed with the court', or the
moment in time when the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.6
Very early, Ohio opted for the second method of commencement.7 Thus,
in the first Code of Civil Procedure enacted in 18531 we found the following
provisions pertaining to the commencement of a lawsuit:
Section 55: A civil action must be commenced by filing in the office
of the clerk of the proper court, a petition, and causing a summons to
be issued thereon. 9
Section 56: The plaintiff shall, also, file with the clerk of the court,
a praecipe, stating the names of the parties to the action, and demanding
that a summons issue thereon."1
Section 20: An action shall be deemed commenced within the meaning
of this title, as to each defendant, at the date of the summons which is
served on him, or on a co-defendant who is a joint contractor, or other-
wise united in interest with him: where service by publication is proper,
the action shall be deemed commenced at the date of the first publica-
tion, which publication must be regularly made.
An attempt to commence an action shall be deemed equivalent to
the commencement thereof, within the meaning of this title, when the party
faithfully, properly and diligiently, endeavors to procure a service: but
such attempt must be followed by service within sixty days."
The first paragraph of Section 20 of the 1853 Code presented difficulties when
the concept of commencement was considered in conjunction with the statute
of limitations. 1 , For example, an action would not be deemed to be commenced
if the statute of limitations ran prior to or during the time interval between
the filing of the petition and praecipe and the actual service of the summons,
4J. SWAN, PRACTICE AND PRECEDENTS, 177 (Columbus 1845) referring to a complaint as a declaration.
Over the years different jurisdictions have given the initiating document various names. These names have
ranged from declaration to petition, and then finally to a complaint. Today the initiating document is
titled a complaint in Ohio.
'CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 350 (West 1954). This section states that "an action is commenced, within
the meaning of this Title, when the complaint is filed (enacted 1872)."
'OHIO R. Civ.P. 3(A). Although RULE 3(A) states service, the actual meaning is jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant.
'1853 OHIO LAWS 66, 60, §§ 55-56, 20.
'Id. at § 56. Prior to the 1853 Code in 1 J. SWAN, PRACTICE AND PRECEDENTS. 110 (Columbus 1845) it
stated that "common law actions are in general, commenced by summons....
'Id. at § 55.
"Id. at § 56.
"Id. at § 20.
"Eastman and Kane, Commencement of a Civil Action in Ohio for Application of the Statute of Limitations,
16 OHIO ST. LA. J. 140-41 (1955). According to the authors, this section (referring to OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2305.17 (Page 1965)), formerly §§ 11230 & 11231 of the GENERAL CODE and formerly § 20 of 1853
[Vol. 16:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
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FAILURE OF COMMENCEMENT
because commencement was deemed effective with the service of the summons.
Without service there was no commencement and without commencement the
statute of limitations could bar the action.'3 To commence a law suit successfully,
plaintiff's attorney was, in effect, required to file the petition and praecipe well
within the statute of limitations period. The rule had the effect of shortening
the statute of limitations period for any given action."'
To resolve this problem, the General Assembly enacted the second
paragraph of Section 20:
An attempt to commence an action shall be deemed equivalent to the
commencement thereof, within the meaning of this title, when the party
faithfully, properly and diligently, endeavors to procure a service: but such
attempt must be followed by service within sixty days. 5
This provision in the statute gave the plaintiff a grace period of sixty days if
the petition and praecipe were filed prior to the running of the statute of limita-
tions. If service was achieved within sixty days, the date of service was deemed
to relate back to the date on which the petition was filed and commencement
was considered to have taken place as of the filing date of the petition.' 6
OHIo LAWS 51)
has presented problems of construction and application. In passing, it may be well to note that
this section determines the time of commencement of the action only for the purpose of the statute
of limitations, and that only this section fixes the time of commencement for that purpose. There
seems to be some degree of confusion on this proposition, probably because Ohio Revised Code
Section 2703.01 (11279) determines the time of commencement of the action for other
purposes.... The supreme court has said that this section provides the manner of commencing
all civil action, but it is equally clear that it fixes the time of commencement for purposes other
than the statute of limitations. Of course, summons must issue within the period of the statute
of limitations; the date of the summons is the date of issuance, and this date becomes the date
of commencement, if the summons is thereafter served. But issuance of summons so dated does
not, without service, commence the action and arrest the statute of limitations.
Id.
"Baltimore and O.R. Co. v. Ambach, 55 Ohio St. 553, 45 N.E. 719 (1896).
"For example, if the plaintiff knew that there would be difficulty in obtaining service on the defendant
in a situation involving an action subject to a two-year statute of limitations, riling would have to be
sufficiently early in the two-year period to guarantee service on the defendant. Although the statute of
limitations period span two years, the threat of not obtaining valid and effective service needed for
commencement could theoretically shorten that period by a year or even more.
"1853 OHIo LAWS 60, § 20.
"In Mason v. Waters, 6 Ohio St. 2d 212, 217 N.E.2d 213, 216 (1966) service was not achieved within
the sixty days attempt to commence provision of OHIO REV. CODE ANN.. § 2305.17 (Page 1965) (formerly
§§ 11230-11231 of the GENERAL CODE and § 20 of 1953 OHIo LAWS 60) and the court found that "a
nonexistant case cannot be dismissed." Also, in Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285, 288
(1954) the trial court improperly dismissed a case, otherwise than on the merits, in which service had not
been achieved within the 60 days grace period of the attempt to commence provision and the statute of
limitations had run. On appeal the court stated that "although on the Lorain county court docket there
appears the words, 'dismissed without prejudice', what that court did was merely to strike the petition
from the files ... (and) (i)t seems axiomatic that a nonexistent case can not be dismissed." Id. at 288.
Plaintiff's claim "ignores the limiting provision of that section (GEN. CODE 11231, and OHIO REv. CODE
ANN., § 2305.17 (Page 1965)) which is that the attempt to commence an action is equivalent to its
commencement only if the party diligently endeavors to procure service and if such attempt be followed
by service within sixty days." Id. at 288.
These cases point out the differentiation that was made by the court. If timely service is improperly
made within the sixty day period the action is not commenced. Wasyk v. Trent, 174 Ohio St. 574, 191
N.E.2d 58 (1963); Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285 (1954). And, if the summons is
Fall, 1982]
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From 1853 until 1965, the statutory provisions governing the commence-
ment of civil actions remained substantially the same. These provisions pro-
vided for a date of service rule with a date of filing rule exception for statute
of limitation cases. Therefore, commencement was the date of service, when
service was accomplished prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations,' 7
and commencement was the date the petition was filed, if filed prior to the
running of the statute of limitations with service being accomplished after the
expiration of the statute of limitations, but prior to the expiration of sixty days
following the date of the filing of the petition.' 8 Of course, in this latter situa-
tion, the action was an "action attempted to be commenced" during the period
of time between the filing of the petition and the date of service, or for the
duration of the sixty day period.'"
In 1965 the General Assembly: (1) abolished the date of service rule, (2)
lengthened the period in which an action was attempted to be commenced from
sixty days to one year, and (3) made the year long attempt to commence period
applicable to all actions whether or not there were statute of limitations pro-
blems. From 1965 on every action was deemed to be commenced at the date
of filing if service of the summons was achieved within the year. The date of
service related back validating the date of the filing of the complaint as the
date of commencement. It is this relation back factor and the attempt to be
commenced period that had caused all of the difficulty in the interpretation
of the earlier statutes. Instead of eliminating the problem that had previously
occurred only in statute of limitation cases, the General Assembly exacerbated
the problem and made every case a potential problem. 0 The effect of this was
to create a patachwork date of filing rule which depended upon a timely relation
back of the date of service rule.
Some of the consequences of this modified rule are the lengthening of the
statute of limitations by as long as a year2' and, in the right circumstances,
through the application of the Savings Statute" by as much as two years and
perhaps indefinitely. 3 On the other hand, a timely filed action could find that
it failed actual commencement long before the statute of limitations expired
not issued timely but served properly, the action is commenced. Robinson v. Commercial Motor Freight,
Inc., 174 Ohio St. 498, 198 N.E.2d 441 (1963).
"Id. The history of the statute is: OHIO REv. CODE ANN., §§ 2703.01,2703.02 & 2305.17 (Pages 1974) OHIO
REV. CODE ANN., §§ 2305.17 (Pages 1962) (superseded); OHIO GEN. CODE, §§ 11230, 11231, 11279 & 11280
(19190); OHIO REV. STAT., §§ 4987, 4988, 5035 & 5036 (1880).
"Id.
"Id.
"Compare 1853 OHIO LAWS 60, 66 §§ 20, 55, 56 with OHIO R. Civ. P. 3(A).
"If a complaint is filed one day preceeding the running of the statute of limitations for that action, the
one year service provision of OHIO R. Civ. P. 3(A) allows the statute of limitations to be extended by one year.
"OHIO REv. CODE AN. § 2305.19 (Page 1981).
"Under the right circumstances a filing preceding the running of the statute of limitations for a particular
action, coupled with a subsequent dismissal by the court, otherwise than on the merits, could invoke the
one year provision of OHIO R. Civ. P. 3(A) and the additional one year savings provision of OHIO R. CODE
ANN., § 2305.19 (1981).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:2
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simply because jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was not acquired
within a year following the filing of the initiating document.24
With the enactment of the Modern Courts Amendment to the Ohio
Constitution,25 the supreme court was given the power and authority to rectify
the damage done by the General Assembly. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
enhanced the damage by enacting Civil Rule 3(A) which reads as follows:
A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court, if ser-
vice is obtained within one year from such filing. 26
Thus, the built-in contradiction in Section 20 of the 1853 Code27 (that had created
the essential problem of the metaphysical concept of attempted to be commenced
and the relation back ambiguities) was retained through all of the code modifica-
tions and amendments and was carried over into Rule 3(A).2" While other
jurisdictions29 opted for a simplified version of commencement where the filing
of a complaint with the clerk of the court commences the action,30 the State
of Ohio had chosen to retain and expand its metaphysical concept of attempted
to be commenced. The exception designed to accommodate the statute of limita-
tions became the rule.
III. THE LANGUAGE OF THE RULE
The brevity of the rule disguises its actual complexity. Rule 3(A) states
that a civil action is commenced in Ohio "by filing a complaint with the court,
if service is obtained within one year from such filing." 3' The vital components
of the Rule are: "civil action", "filing", "complaint", "court", "service" and
"Browne, Ohio Civil Rule 8(C) and Related Rules, 27 CLEVELAND STATE L. REV. 329, 364 (1978).
"Browne's article states that the
'Modern Courts Amendment' is the popular name given Amend. Sub. H.J. Res. 42, 107th G.A.,
1968 OHIO LAWS 132 (effective Jan. 10, 1970). The amendment was approved by a vote of the people
of Ohio on May 7, 1968. 1968 OHIo LAWS 132; Modern Courts Amendment Approved By Voters,
41 OHIO BAR 682 (1968). The 'Modern Courts Amendment' was itself amended by Amend. St. J.
Res. 30, 110th G.A., 1974 OHIO LAWS 135 (effective Nov. 6, 1973). But this latter amendment did
not materially affect the power of the supreme court to prescribe procedural rules.
Browne, Civil Rule 1 and the Principle of Primacy-A Guide to the Resolution of Conflicts Between Statutes
and the Civil Rules, 5 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 363, 399 n.147 (1978).
"OHIo R. Civ. P. 3(A).
271853 OHIO LAWS 60 (superseded). See OHIO R. Civ. P. 3(A).
"OHIO R. Civ. P. 3(A).
"In California, the court stated that:
[alt the common law, as is claimed by appellant, actions were commenced by the issurance of a
capias and delivery to the Sheriff, with intent to have it served. But from time immemorial a different
rule prevailed in equity, and the filing of the bill (complaint) was a commencement of the action
to take the case out of the operation of the statute. (2d ed. Revised State. of N.Y. 227; 2 Barb.
Ch. Prac. 53; 1 Id. 53; 3 Paige, 204, 7 Id. 197; 24 Wend. 587; 2 Denio, 577.) So in England.
(Newland's Ch. Prac. 1, ed. of 1818; 1 Daniel's Ch. Prac. secs, 468, 469.) In this State a uniform
rule is established by the Legislature, applicable alike to actions at law and suits in equity.
Pimental v. City of San Francisco 21 Cal. 351 (1863).
"CALIF. CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE ANN., § 350 (West 1954) states that "an action is commenced, within the
meaning of this Title, when the complaint is filed. (Enacted 1872)." Also, FED. R. Civ. P. 3 states that
"a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."
"OHIO R Civ. P. 3(A).
Fall, 19821
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the "one year" time period.32 Although apparently simple, each of these com-
ponents is complex and subject to multiple interpretations through the applica-
tion of other rules, case law and one's creative processes. A discussion of these
components and their requirements follow.
The first component of the Rule limits its application to civil actions. As
a general rule this is true, but under the provisions of Civil Rule I(C)33, the
"commencement concept" of Civil Rule 3(A) is to be applied to special statutory
proceedings if, by its nature, it is clearly applicable.3 ' The few cases on point
suggest that it is clearly applicable if the special statutory procedure is adversary
in nature, and the use of the "commencement concept" will not frustrate the
purpose of the proceeding. 3"
The second component of Rule 3(A), the filing requirement, can not be
understood in terms of Rule 5(E) and its filing requirements alone; rather a
review of the case law in this area is essential to provide a framework that can
be used to define the requirements for filing. This framework includes the
elements of time, place, person, method and content. Time, the first element,
poses only one major problem for commencement. Filing must occur prior to
the running of the statute of limitations for actions limited by statutes of
limitations. 36 If filing occurs subsequent to the running of the state of limita-
tions for a particular action, a statute of limiations defense, if properly raised
by the respondent, can effectively bar the action. Lack of knowledge as to the
relationship between the statute of limitations and Rule 3(A) has aborted a
number of actions that were otherwise properly commenced.
The place and person elements for filing are interrelated. The person who
receives the initiating document is either the clerk of the court or in special
circumstances the judge. Rule 5(E) governs the person requirement and states:
The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as required by
these rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court, except
that the judge may permit the papers to be filed with him, in which event
he shall note thereon the filing date and forthwith transmit them to the
321d.
33OHIO R. Civ. P. I(A).
"4OHIO R. Civ. P. I(C).
"Carroll, The Meaning of The Term 'Trial' Within the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 CLEVELAND
STATE L. REV. 550 (1976). Also, Proctor v. Giles, 12 Ohio Op. 3d 74, (Hamilton County, 1979); Carter v.
Johnson, 55 Ohio App. 2d 157, 380 N.E.2d 758 (Cuyahoga County, 1978); Lysaght v. Dollison, 61 Ohio
App. 2d 59, 399 N.E.2d 121 (Hamilton County, 1978); State, ex rel. Civil Rights Comm. v. Gunn, 45
Ohio St. 2d 262, 344 N.E.2d 327 (1976); Yancey v. Pyles, 44 Ohio App. 2d 410, 339 N.E.2d 835 (Hamilton
County, 1975); Beverly v. Beverly, 33 Ohio App. 2d 199, 293 N.E.2d 562 (Eire County, 1973) and Gibbs
v. Lemley, 33 Ohio App. 2d 220, 293 N.E.2d 324 (Lawrency County, 1972).
"For example, actions for bodily injury or injury to property must be brought within the two-year period
specified in OHIO REV. CODE ANN., § 2305.10 (Page 1981). See also 81 2305.03-2305.49. Also in Klema v.
St. Elizabeth's Hospital of Youngstown, 170 Ohio St. 519, 166 N.E.2d 765, 770 (1960) the court stated
that "[s]ince 1788, statutes relating to limitations of action have existed in this state. (1 Laws of the Northwest
Territory, 25)."
[Vol. 16:2
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office of the clerk.37
A difficulty encountered in Rule 5(E) is the reference to the filing of "pleadings
and papers." Although the rule requires that "pleadings and other papers"
are to be filed with the clerk, it also states that the judge may permit "the papers"
to be filed with him or her. There are at least two possible interpretations for
the phrase, "the papers." Either the rule intends that "the papers" to be filed
with the judge include "pleadings and other papers" referred to in the first
sentence of the rule or "the papers" referred to in the third sentence are limited
to "other papers" and, therefore, exclude pleadings. If the interpretation of
"the papers" means "pleadings and other papers" then a filing of the initiating
document can occur with the clerk of the court and, if permitted by the judge,
with the judge. If the interpretation of "the papers" means only "other papers"
and not pleadings, then the filing of pleadings can occur only with the clerk
of the court. Unfortunately the Ohio Rules Advisory Committee Staff Note
to this rule does not clarify it.3"
The forth element required for filing is the method of filing. The court
requires an actual delivery of the initiating document not a constructive one.
By definition actual delivery means that the initiating document must be given
to the clerk of the court.3 9 In addition, the phrase "given to the clerk" is defined
as the clerk's taking "knowing possession and custody"" ° of the document.
An example of what is not actual delivery may clarify its meaning. A leaving
of the document at the clerk's office, pushing it under the clerk's office door
after working hours, or placing it in the mail 1 are all considered to be con-
structive delivery, not actual delivery, and are consequently not effective delivery.
Anything less than actual delivery is not considered to be an effective delivery.
Concomitant with the method and person elements for filing is the issue
of selecting the place for filing, i.e., the proper court for the action. Prior to
the enactment of Rule 3(A), Ohio Revised Code section 2305.17 had defined
the place for filing as the "proper court," which was defined as the court with
the appropriate subject matter jurisdiciton. Today, Rule 3(A) requires that filing
be with "the court" only. 2 The issue raised by the phrase "the court" is whether
"OHIo R. Civ. P. 5(E).
3"OHIO R. Civ. P. 5. The Staff Notes states only that "Rule 5(E) defines the act of filing pleadings and other
papers."
"King v. Paylor, 69 Ohio App. 193, 43 N.E.2d 313, 314 (1st Dist. 1942) states that "a filing can only
be accomplished by bringing the paper to the notice of the officer, so that it can be accepted by him as
official custodian."
10In Kahler-Ellis Co. v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 225 F.2d 922, 923 (6th Cir. 1955) the court stated
that "[h]ere, only the act of depositing the notice in the mails occurred within thirty days. This is not
a filing; only when the clerk acquires custody has it been filed." Id. Also in Casaldera v. Diaz 117 F.2d
915, 916 (1st Cir. 1941) the court stated that "[fliling means delivery of the paper into the actual custody
of the proper officer."
'Snabes v. Fether, No. CA-5052 (Ohio App. Stark County, filed July 5, 1979), reprinted in 54 OHio BAR
1913 (1979). Also, in Oravecz v. Board of Review, No. 42836 (Ohio App. Cuyahoga County, filed May
14, 1981) the court was specific in defining the method of filing and concluded "that filing means the
actual delivery . . . determined by the date upon which the (document) is actually received." Id.
"2Howard v. Allen, 30 Ohio St. 2d 130, 283 N.E.2d 167, 170 (1972). The court stated that "lilt is apparent
Fall, 19821
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"the court" as specified in Rule 3(A) is equivalent to the "proper court" as
specified in former section 2305.17. The phrase, "the court," in Rule 3(A) would
seem to purport a different meaning but at least one decision has interpreted
"the court" stated in Rule 3(A) to mean the "proper court" as defined by sec-
tion 2305.17. Thus, in Moyer v. Moyer 3 "the institution of proper proceedings
means commencement of an action pursuant to Rule 3(A) in a court with sub-
ject matter jurisdiction." 4 Although Moyer states the general rule, there is one
exception to the rule when the action is commenced mistakenly in the wrong
division of a multidivision court. It has been held to be prejudicial error for
the court to dismiss the action rather than to transfer it to the appropriate
division. 5 Still, "proper court" is defined as the court with appropriate sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the action."
The fifth element of filing, content, poses its own questions of interpreta-
tion also. In Rule 3(A) it states that the "complaint" must be filed. The com-
plaint contains the required content. The content for the complaint is prescrib-
ed by Rules 10(A) and 10(B)."1 These rules outline the basic elements of the
complaint. For example, the complaint must include a caption, ' name of the
court,"' title of the action, 9 case number,50 designation,' and the names and
addresses of all parties.5 2 In addition, each paragraph of the document, that
is the body of the complaint that sets forth a claim(s) for relief, must be
numbered consecutively," separated as to each claim, and must include a
heading"4 for each section. But the requirements of Rules 10(A) and 10(B) are
not the only rules that define the elements of the complaint. In addition, Rule
8(A) specifies that the complaint must include a statement of the claim," and
that the word 'court' as used in Civ. R. 3(A) refers to an Ohio court, since Rule 1(A) provides that the Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure be limited to courts of this state."
"No. 36991 (Ohio App. Cuyahoga County, filed July 6, 1978), reprinted in 51 OHio BAR 1305 (1978).
"Id.
"Siebenthal v. Summers, 56 Ohio App. 2d 168, 381 N.E.2d 1344, 1345 (10th Dist. 1978). In this case
"[t]he clerk docketed the case on the docket of the General Division of the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas, rather than the Probate Division. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff filed a motion for an order transferring the action to the Probate Division."
Id. The issue in the case was "whether an action can be transferred from the docket of one division of
the Court of Common Pleas, in which it has for whatever reason been improperly docketed, to another
division of the same court." Id. at 1347. The court concluded that "Civ. R. 73(B) authorized the General
Division of the Court of Common Pleas under the circumstances of this case to transfer the action from
its docket to the docket of the Probate Division of the same court." Id. at 1348.
'OHIo R. Civ. P. 10(A) and 10(B).
"OIo R. CIv. P. 10(A).
4"Id.
"'Id.
3d.
"Id.
5 Id.
sOHio R. Civ. P. 10(B). The rule does not specify consecutive but custom has so specified.
54Id.
"OHIo R. Civ. P. 8(A). The complaint should simply tell what happened and link it to the defendant.
[Vol. 16:2
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a demand for judgment.5 6 Additionally, Rule 1 1 mandates that each pleading
must be signed by the attorney of record or the pleader.57 This signature must
meet the ethical requirements of Rule 11 also.II Therefore, the content of the
initiating document, the complaint, is defined by Rules 10(A), 10(B), 8(A), and
11. 9 In addition to the above rules, local rules have to be examined to deter-
mine if additional requirements are specified for the complaint .6  For exam-
ple, in a multi-judge court the name of the judge to whom the case has been
assigned may be required by local rule. 61 Therefore, multiple rules govern the
content of the complaint and these requirements include those set by local rules
for a particular court as well as the civil rules.
A case that may provide guidance on this point is Spratt v. Frederickson
62
where the defendant, on appeal, claimed that her personal letters that were filed
with the court in response to the plaintiff's complaint constituted an answer
within the meaning of the rules. 63 The court's response was that the letters were
not sufficient to meet the rule requirements for an answer because the letters
did not meet the requirements set forth in Rule 10(A), 10(B)64 or 5(D). 65 If one
extends the court's position on the sufficiency of an answer to be applicable
to the complaint, then it would appear evident that the minimum acceptable
for a complaint includes the requirements set forth in Rules 10(A), and 10(B).
Since the plaintiff had signed the letters, one could interpolate from this act
and its implied inclusion by the court that the court's intent was to include Rule
11 signature as part of the minimum also. Still, the Spratt requirements may
be too harsh.
'1OHio R. Civ. P. 8(A) states:
a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim,
or thirdy-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself
entitled. Relied in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
Id.
And, it should be noted that in situations involving damages OHIO R. Civ. P. 54(C) applies.
"OHIO R. Civ. P. 11 states:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of
record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by
an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address ...
Id.
"Browne, J. Patrick, The Significance of The Signature: A Comment On The Obligations Imposed By
Civil Rule 11, 30 CLEVELAND STATE L. REV. 385 (1981).
"OOHIO R. Civ. P. 54(C), 9, 10(C) and 10(D) delineate other specifications in special circumstances. For
example, in Sexton v. The New York Central Railroad Co., 112 Ohio App. 498, 172 N.E.2d 167, 168
(1959) "the plaintiff's praecipe did not recite, nor did the summons carry, the amount for which judgment
was claimed. In our opinion, the motion to quash the original service of summons was, therefore, properly
sustained." Id. In accord with OHIO REV. CODE ANN., § 2703.02 (Page 1981) the amount of money for which
the judgment is sought must be included.
"eCUYAHOGA COUNTY R. Civ. P. of the Court of Common Pleas, RULE 8 states the local rules as to pleadings
and motions.
"Id. at RULE 8(A).
6"Spratt v. Frederickson No. 38579, (Ohio App. Cuyahoga County, filed April 26, 1979).
63Id.
6,Id.
651d.
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Another way of analyzing the minimum content for the complaint is to
contrast the requirements of Rule 8(A) with those found in Rules 10(A) and
10(B). The substantive defects of Rule 8(A) are typically challenged by defenses
whereas form defects of a Rule 10(A) or 10(B) nature are challenged by objec-
tion. Since an objection merely suspends an action until the defect is corrected,
then it would seem unlikely that a Rule 10(A) or 10(B) defect should do more
than suspend the action until the defect is corrected. If this analysis is correct,
then Rule 8(A) would appear to set forth the minimum requirement for the
complaint.
Additional support for Rule 8(A) is found in Rule 15(C)." Substantive
defects of a Rule 8(A) type can be corrected by amendment and Rule 15(C) 67
provides that the amendment will relate back to the date of the original
complaint:
[w]henever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to
be set forth in the original pleading .. .61 (emphasis added.)
This would indicate that less than perfection is acceptable in the complaint.
From an analysis of Rule 8(A) and Rule 15(C) it appears that the complaint,
at a minimum, must contain three elements: the statement of the claim or an
attempted statement of the claim,6 9 the demand for judgment and an appropriate
signature.70
Additional support for the argument that minimum for the complaint is
specified by Rule 8(A) are cases that differentiate the requirements for the caption
from those of the complaint, stating that the caption is not a part of the
complaint,' and that if it were not for the statute" there would be no need
for a caption. It is vital to note that the function of the initiating document
is to bring the lawsuit into existence. Once the parties have commenced their
action, evidence and proof for the cause of action will be supplied through
discovery and rules of evidence. Therefore, logic would posit that formal defects
"6OHIO R. Civ. P. 15(A).
68Id.
"*Id.
"Hunt v. Rohrbaugh, 171 Ohio St. 92, 168 N.E.2d 299, 305 (1960) found that a defective verification
did not destroy the petition. "[tihe fact that the verification was defective or even lacking did not destroy
the character of the original petition." Id. If no verification had been attached, the pleading would still
have been a petition. The dissent was quite interesting in this case and stated that "the statutory thing
to be amended must exist, before the power [to amend] can be exercised." Id. at 106. The dissent refers
to Shomokin Bank v. Zadok Street, 16 Ohio St. 1, 10 (1864) where the court stated that "I know the
general power of amendment given to the courts by the code is very broad, and is only limited by the
'justice' of the case. But the statutory thing to be amended must exist, before the power can be exercised."Id.
I°OHIo R. Civ. P. 8(A) and 11.
"Hunt v. Rohrbaugh, 171 Ohio St. 92, 168 N.E. 299, 299 (1960) stated that the petition was still a petition
without the verification.
7"OHIO R. Civ. P. 10(A).
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are not as significant as substantive defects. Still, the seriousness of the defect
must be blanced against the cost of delay and inconvenience that are imposed
by a refusal to accept anything less than perfection in the complaint. But until
there is a clear definition by the court as to the minimum allowable for a com-
plaint, the minimum requirements will remain at issue.
If the above elements of time, person, place, method and content are met
for filing and the complaint meets all requirements set forth in the rules, Rule
3(A) still requires service, or more properly stated, an acquisition of jurisdic-
tion over the person of the defendant. Rule 3(A) specifies service, but upon
close examination it is apparent that Rule 3(A) actually intends jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant as the essential requirement. This intention can
be supported by analyzing the requirements of Rule 4(D) in the context of Rule
3(A). For example, Rule 4(D) states:
Service of summons may be waived in writing by any person entitled thereto
under Rule 4.2 who is at least eighteen years of age and not under
disability."
If service were intended by Rule 3(A), rather than jurisdiction, then Rule 4(D)
would be rendered meaningless, because a waiver of service would render com-
mencement impossible since service will never be obtained when there was a
waver of service. In addition to Rule 4(D), a waiver of service can occur when
the defendent makes a general appearance." In this situation specifically the
court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant but has not
achieved it by means of service. In situations where waiver occurs commence-
ment would not be achieved if Rule 3(A) were taken literally to mean service
instead of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Consequently, Rule
3(A) must be read to purport jurisdiction over the person of the defendant rather
than service.
But, if the Rule means "acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant," why does it speak in terms of "service"?" Perhaps because, in
the vast majority of cases, jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the ser-
vice of a summons. This is the norm, and Rule 3(A) speaks to the norm rather
than to the exception. Therefore, the Rule speaks of "service," rather than
jurisdiction.
Again, the Rule means more than it states. While it specifies "service,"
it really intends "the effective service of a valid summons.'6 Accordingly, we
"PHIO R. Civ. P. 4(D).
74Akron-Canton Regional Airport v. Swinehart, 62 Ohio St. 2d 403, 406 N.E.2d 811, 815 (1980) "By filing
this answer, an appearance was made and appellees consented to the personal jurisdiction of the
court.... Because of the invalid service the time for the answer had not begun to run until that appearance.
The answer filed upon that date was therefore timely and the cause should proceed from that point. Id.
"OHIo R. Civ. P. 3(A) states that "a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court, if service
is obtained within one year from such filing." And, validity and effectiveness of service of process is governed
by OHIO R. Civ. P. 4-4.6.
"Lash v. Miller, 50 Ohio St. 2d 63, 362 N.E.2d 642, 642 (1977).
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must inquire into the essentials of a valid summons and the elements of effec-
tive service. A valid summons includes the essentials stated in Rule 4(B).
Specifically, the Rule states that the summons:
shall be signed by the clerk, contain the name and address of the court
and the names and addresses of the parties, be directed to the defendant,
state the name and address of the plaintiff's attorney, if any, otherwise
the plaintiff's address . . . .
Likewise, effective service of process must be achieved for successful commence-
ment of the action.7" Effective service can be achieved by means of certified
mail, personal or residence service" as delineated in Rules 4.1 through 4.6. In
addition, Rule 4.6(A) specifies the geographical limitations of service to be
"anywhere in this state."" And Rule 4.1 specifies the individuals who can serve
the process.8 ' In fact, Rule 4.1(2) designates the bailiff as the process server
for the municipal court when service is by personal means and within the
geographical jurisdiction of the court. 2 And, Rule 4.1(2) designates the sheriff
of the defendant's county of residence as the proper process server for all other
courts and geographical areas. An additional option is offered in Rule 4.1(2)
that provides for service to be made by a private process server, if the process
server is eighteen years of age or older, is not a party to the action and is
designated as a process server by court order.83 Therefore, the service specified
in Rule 3(A) is governed by Rules 4 through 4.6, and is limited to valid and
effective service.
However, even if service is letter perfect as far as the rules are concerned,
it will not be effective service if the means selected for serving the summons
are not reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice. The test for
effective service is stated in Akron-Canton Regional Airport v. Swinehart: "
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any pro-
ceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. 5
7"OHio R. Civ. P. 4(B).
"Mason v. Waters, 6 Ohio St. 2d 212, 217 N.E.2d 213, 213 (1966); Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio St. 378,
119 N.E.2d 285, 285 (1954). Also, Scott v. Orlando, (Lucas County, filed July 31, 1981); Pistner v. Baxter,
No. 80 AP-969 (Franklin County, filed June 2, 1981); Fieno v. Beaton, 68 Ohio App. 2d 13, 426 N.E.2d
203 (Hamilton County, 1980); Dirker v. Seven Up Bottling Co., (Summit County, filed August 1, 1979);
Conway v. Smith, 66 Ohio App. 2d 65, 419 N.E.2d 1117 (Cuyahoga County, 1979); Balson v. Balson
(Franklin County, filed June 13, 1978); Lozier v. Thorne, No. 5-78-34 (Hancock County, filed October
18, 1978); Vansant v. Curnutte, No. 1327 (Lawrence County, filed October 18, 1978); State, ex rel. Balson
v. Harnishfeger (Allen County, filed February 9, 1978); McCann v. American Mobile Home Repair, No.
932 (Athens County, filed September 22, 1978); Lash v. Miller, 50 Ohio St. 2d 63 (1977).
"7OHIO R. Civ. P. 4.1.
'*OHio R. Civ. P. 4.6(A).
" OHIO R. Civ. P. 4.1.
"fOHIO R. Civ. P. 4.1(2).
"Id.
1
4Akron-Canton Regional Airport v. Swinehart, 62 Ohio St. 403, 406 N.E.2d 811 (1980).
"Id. at 814. In this case, the court found that "service was not made in a manner 'reasonably calculated'
[Vol. 16:2
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In addition to the requirements for filing, the specifications for the con-
tent of the complaint and the specifics of jurisdiction over the person, Rules
3(A) provides a one year limitation for achieving service.", The one year re-
quirement of Rule 3(A) is merely an extension of the 1853 code's "attempt
to commence period of sixty days." 8 The significant issue that is still unresolved
is what is meant by a "year" in Rule 3(A) and how is it calculated? If Rule
6(A) is a guide to Rule 3(A), then the time period for calculating the one year
period begins the day following the filing of the complaint. This aspect of Rule
6(A) may appear simple enough but when the calculation is considered at the
ending of the year the situation poses some dispute. For example, is the end
of the year midnight on the calendar anniversary of the initiating date, or is
it 365 days subsequent to the day following the filing of the complaint? If the
year ends on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday will the time be extended
to the following day that is not a legal holiday or a Saturday or Sunday?88
For example, Rule 6(A) states that:
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by
the local rules of any court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute,
the date of the act, even, or default from which the designated period
of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period
so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal
holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which
is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday.8 9
Now, the "Saturday, Sunday or legal holidy" provision is included in the Rule
to provide a grace period when something, such as filing, must be done in the
clerk's office, and the clerk's office is closed. But service of process is effected
on the individual defendant wherever he or she may be found, and valid ser-
vice does not require that anything be done in the clerk's office. Further, an
otherwise valid service is not rendered invalid because it is made on the defen-
dant on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. Therefore, the "Saturday, Sun-
day or legal holiday" provision of Rule 6(A) has no logical application to the
service requirement of Rule 3(A), and one may legitimately speculate whether
it serves to extend the one year period provided by Rule 3(A) when the last
day of that year falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.
The difficulties in applying Rule 6 to Rule 3(A) were raised in Rahm v.
Hemsoth. 90 In this case, Ohio Revised Code section 1.14, rather than Rule 6(A),
was construed with Rule 3(A) and provided that the end of the year time period
did not end on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday but was extended to the
to reach appellee, Sengpiel. He did not maintain an office on the premises of the business where he was
attempted to be served. His principal place of business was in fact in another city. Id.
"fOHIO R. Civ. P. 3(A).
'11853 OHIO LAWS 60 § 20, paragraph 2.
88M.
"Id.
"Rahm v. Hemsoth, 53 Ohio App. 2d.147, 372 N.E.2d 358, 358 (6th Dist. 1976).
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next working day. Given the act which is to be performed, service on the
defendant, if service is validly made on a holiday then the provision of section
1.14 applied to Rule 3(A), in the Rahm case, does not make much sense.
More clarification is needed in the computation of the one year requirement
of Rule 3(A).
If one were to restate Rule 3(A), given the information above, the rule
might read as follows: a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with
the clerk of the court having subject matter jurisdiction, prior to the running
of the statute of limitations for the action. Filing consists of actual delivery
of the complaint to the clerk of the court with the complaint complying with
Rules 10(A), 10(B), 8(A) and 11. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
must be acquired by valid and effective service, unless waived, and must be
obtained within one calendar year subsequent to the date of the filing of the
complaint. If the calendar year ends on a weekend or holiday these days can
be excluded from the one year calculation. The date on which the defendant
actually receives service relates back and validates the date of the filing of the
original complaint as the official commencement date. All other time periods
for the action are calculated from the date of defendant's actual receipt of service.
The problem inherent in the interpretation of the language of Rule 3(A)
are aggravated further when placed in the context of existence, capacity to sue
or be sued and the defenses that challenge a failure of commencement. These
problems will be analyzed now.
IV. EXISTENCE AND CAPACITY: THE UNSTATED PREREQUISITES
Although Rule 3(A)91 delineates the essentials for commencing an action,
the filing of a complaint with the clerk of the court provided that service is
achieved within one year, 92 there are two major, essential and unstated prere-
quisites for the Rule. These unstated prerequisites are the plaintiff's and defen-
dant's existence and their capacity to sue or be sued. Without existence and
capacity" the action may not be commenced.
"OHIO R. Civ. P. 3(A).
921d.
"3BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 188 (5th rev. ed. 1979) defines capacity as "legal qualification (i.e., legal age),
competency, power or fitness. Ability to understand the nature and effects of one's acts. The ability of
a particular individual or entity to use, or to be brought into, the courts of a forum." Id. WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcrIONARY (1971) defines existence as "reality or actuality as opposed to
appearance, the state or fact of having being especially as considered independently of human consciousness
and as contrasted with nonexistence, the manner of being that is common to every mode of being, the
state common to physical objects, objects of thought, or anything else." Id. at 796.
In Perkins v. Mining Co., 155 Ohio St. 116, 98 N.E.2d 33, 36 (1951) the court stated that:
[h]istorically, at common law, a legal unit, or an entity recognized by the law, was either a natural
person or not. If not, it was a corporation and consent of the king was necessary for its creation.
Blackstone's Commentaries, Book I, 123, 467, 472, 475. In the United States, the necessity of the
king's consent was replaced by the necessity of the legislature's concent. 2 Kent's Commentaries,
276 . . . The decisions of this court have usually recognized that, in order to be a corporation,
an organization must be a legal unit or be recognized as an entity by the law of the state or country
in which it was organized.
[Vol. 16:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
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The requirement of plaintiff's existence is made explicitly clear in Levering
v. Riverside Methodist Hospital,9" where on plaintiff's appeal from summary
judgment for defendant the lower court's decision was affirmed. The court found
that since the plaintiff had been deceased when counsel filed the complaint,
the complaint was a nullity for lack of a party-plaintiff." Also, in Group of
Tenants v. Mar-Len Realty, Inc." an ad hoc group of tenants was not found
to be a legal entity or a party capable of initiating any action or any appeal.
The court stated that "the existence of an identifiable complainant is essential
to the existence of an action. " 97 The tenants that were not designated by name,
could move in and out of the law suit at any time with no one responsible for
the action or for any one set of facts indicative of the action. Thus, the "group"
of unnamed persons had no definable membership and thereby lacked legal
existence as a group, the state of being necessary for commencing an action.98
This necessary prerequisite of plaintiff's existence was enunciated in the
earlier 1973 case of Cleveland Municipal Court v. Cleveland City Council. 9
The complaint was brought by the Cleveland Municipal Court against the
Cleveland City Council, neither of which had legal existence as such. The court
stated that "absent express statutory authority, a court can neither sue nor be
sued in its own right,"' since it does not have existence. The same deficiency
was found for the Cleveland City Council. The court in this case examined
specific facts that were stated in the complaint, counterclaim and the subse-
quent motion to dismiss and found sufficient data to indicate that the action
was being brought by identifiable individual judges and councilmen. Finding
the judges and councilmen to have existence the court allowed the action
to proceed.'0'
The converse of the plaintiff's existence is the necessary existence of the
defendant. Without a defendant there can be no action. In Vocke v. Dayton, 0
the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County found that a plaintiff's suit
against a "John Doe" was insufficient to identify an existent defendant for
the action. In this case the plaintiff filed a suit against the city of Dayton and
three individuals referred to as John Doe. Since the plaintiff did not comply
with Rule 15(D) that requires a description of the alleged John Doe's and their
addresses, the court found that she "lacked not only the names, but also any
"No. 81AP-374 (Franklin County, filed July 14, 1981). Ses, Inc. v. Scott, No WD-81-44 (Wood County,
filed December 11, 1981).
"Id.
'"40 Ohio App. 2d 449, 321 N.E.2d 241, 241 (3d Dist. 1974).
"ld.
"Ild.
"34 Ohio St. 2d 120, 296 N.E.2d 544, 544 (1973).
"'Id. at 547.
1
°1d. at 546.
0236 Ohio App. 2d 139, 303 N.E.2d 892 (2d Dist. 1973).
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really specific clue to the indentity of those sought to be sued."103 The court
added that "Civil Rule 3(A) contemplates, as did R.C. 2305.17 that when an
action is commenced it should be commenced against someone. When the city's
action was dismissed from the law suit (because of sovereign immunity) the
action had been commenced against no one." 0 The court's conclusion in Vocke
was that "[u]nless the action is against some such person, it has not been brought
against anyone, and is therefore not actually begun at all.' 0 5 The defendant
and the plaintiff are essential for commencement of the action.
Also, questions of existence arise in situations where an individual is
deceased and consequently cannot be a defendant in the action. In Brinkley
v. Neuling'06 the court stated that "[i]t is elementary that one deceased cannot
be a party to an action."'' 07 This point was highlighted further in Chandler v.
Dunlop'0 s when the court stated that since the defendant "was dead at the time,
no action could have been commenced thereby against him and the writ was
a nullity as against him."' 09 The court found that there could not have been
an action." '
Theoretically, the importance of defendant's existence for commencing
the action was accepted law as early as 1900. But as late as 1978 in Barnhart
v. Schultz' this same point was still in controvery. In Barnhart' I2 appellees
attempted unsuccessfully to amend the complaint with a Rule 15(C)" I3 amend-
ment. In this case the complaint designated the sole defendant as one that was
deceased at the time the complaint was filed."'" The court reiterated what it
had stated in earlier cases that "there is no complaint against an existing party
for the amended complaint to relate back to."' Therefore, in Barnhart the
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the trial court's
dismissal of the action for lack of a defendant.
"'Id.at 895.
,O4ld.
"'Id. at 896.
1 6256 Wisc. 334, 41 N.W.2d 284, 284 (1950).
1"Id. at 285.
'0 311 Mass. 1, 39 N.E.2d 969, 969 (1942).
'Id. at 975.
'"53 Ohio St. 2d 59, 372 N.E.2d 589, 589 (1978).
"'Id. Also, Baker v. McKnight, No. OT-81-14 (Ohawa County, filed January 15, 1982).
'OHio R. Civ. P. 15(C) states that:
whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction,
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates
back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim
is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by
law for commencing the action against him. ...
Id.
"I53 Ohio St. 2d 59, 372 N.E.2d 589, 591 (1978).
"'Id. In Barnhart the court specifically stated that:
we hold, therefore, that a complaint in negligence which designates as a sole defendent one who
[Vol. 16:2
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Some of the difficult questions in the area of existence are what if plain-
tiff dies before defendant is served. What if defendant dies prior to being served?
What if after the plaintiff dies, the defendant is successfully served? The courts
have answered these questions only partially. In situations where the plaintiff
does prior to the filing of the complaint or the defendant dies prior to being
served, the courts view the action as a nullity. The action cannot be commenced.
If the plaintiff dies subsequent to the filing of the complaint but prior to ser-
vice, counsel can move to substitute the party plaintiff under Rule 25(A). This
substitution is possible because the plaintiff has submitted to the court's jurisdic-
tion by filing and is technically a party. As is seen in Barnhart this is not the
case with the defendant because the defendant does not become a party until
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Still, the courts
have not as yet clarified all of these situations.
Concomitant with plaintiff and defendant's existence are the additional
Rule 3(A) unstated prerequisites involving plaintiff's capacity to sue and defen-
dant's capacity to be sued. In Barnhart v. Schultz, ' " the Ohio Supreme Court
stated that "it is accepted law that an action may only be brought against a
party who actually or legally exists and has the capacity to be sued." II7 Although
capacity was stated by Barnhart to be accepted law, the questions left unanswered
by the case are what is capacity and what are the implications for commence-
ment if capacity does not exist?
Capacity to sue or be sued is in some ways similar to existence and in other
ways different. Capacity is similar to the concept of existence in that it is a
necessary, unstated prerequisite for commencement; it differs from existence
in that it is governed, in general, by the civil rules. Historically, a number of
early cases tended to confuse one's capacity to sue or be sued with one's standing
to sue as a real party in interest. Thus, in Petitt v. Morton' Is the court states that:
died after the cause of action accrued but before the complaint was filed has neither met the
requirements of the applicable statute of limitations, nor commenced an action pursuant to Civ.
R. 3(A) and such complaint may not be amended to substitute any administrator of the deceased
defendant's estate for the original defendant after the limitations period has expired, even though
service on the administrator is obtained within the one-year, post-filing period provided for in Civ.
R. 3(A).
Id. at 592. Also, Catchings v. Cleveland Public Schools, No. 43730 (Cuyahoga County, filed April 1,
1982); Dewey v. Prater, No. L-81-169 (Lucas County, filed December 18, 1981); Nissen v. Callahan, No.
38132 (Cuyahoga County, filed January 11, 1979); Little v. Little, No. CA 6197 (Montgomery County,
filed June 27, 1979); Samstog v. McDonough, 75 Ohio Op. 2d 354 (8th Dist. 1975).
53 Ohio St. 2d 59, 372 (N.E.2d 589, 589 (1978).
'"Id. at 591.
"'in Petitt v. Mortan, 28 Ohio App. 227, 162 N.E. 627, 627 (8th Dist. 1928) the specific details as to
the probating of the earlier will were as follows:
In 1905, Milton Morton, the father of defendant, executed a will and testament, which is said to
be the last will and testament of the descendent, Milton Morton, which was admitted to probate
in due form in the same year.
It is claimed that this will is an instrument of no legal force and effect, because it was forged
by the defendant and fraudulently probated by him .... It appears that earlier on the same day
that this will was made, there was another will made which named as devisee a nephew of the
descendent, the plaintiff in error, Morton Petitt, and it appears that the forgery was not discovered
until years afterward. . ..
Id. at 627. The action in Petitt began after the statute of limitations had run for will probate. The issue
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there can be no suite in law or equity if the plaintiff has no capacity to
sue. That is determined by whether, in any manner, he has an interest
in the subject-matter of the action, and in the case at bar and his interest
must amount to an equitable or a legal ownership in some portion of the
property .... 1
The plaintiff was not a real party in interest and had no interest in the
subject matter of the action; therefore, he did not have "capacity to sue."
In time the two concepts, capacity and standing to sue, were separated
and the term capacity was limited to disability. This distinction between standing
to sue and capacity to sue or be sued is now reflected in Rule 17. Rule 17(A)
treats standing to sue, while capacity to sue in Ohio is basically defined by
Rule 17(B). 120
In Rule 17(B) the major disabilities relate to minors and incompetent
persons. Each can sue or defend it appropriately represented by a next friend,
a guardian, a guardian ad litem, or other fiduciary. 121 If a minor or incompetent
person is not represented in an action "the court shall appoint a guardian ad
litem or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of
such minor or incompetent." 1 2
Although Rule 17(B) accounts for suits by or against minors and
in competent persons, the concept of capacity to sue or be sued is not exhausted
by a discussion of these two disabilities alone. Legal entities have more com-
was "that the plaintiff [had] no capacity to sue or to maintain his action because the unprobated will
[had] never been admitted to probate under the statute, or otherwise, in the county of Cuyahoga, where
the property is located." Id. at 627.
And in State v. City of Cleveland, 141 Ohio St. 518, 49 N.E.2d 175, 176 (1943) the court stated that
the realtor was acting merely as agent for others in the purchase of water for property owners in
the City of Cleveland; that he was reimbursed by those owners for sums paid by him for water,
and that he has in fact no pecuniary interest in the water rates charged by or paid to the City of
Cleveland. Generally, agents have no implied power to institute action even in respect to the subject
matter of their agency.
Id.
Also, in Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533, 535 (1965) the court stated that "at
common law, a married woman lacks capacity to sue or be sued in her own name. This rule has been
changed by statute in Ohio. Sections 2307.09 and 2323.09, Revised Code; Damm v. Elyric Lodge No.
465, Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337." Id.
"'28 Ohio App. 227, 162 N.E. 627, 628 (8th Dist. 1928).
' OHIo R. Civ. P. 17(B), states that:
whenever a minor or incompetent person has a representative, such as a guardian or other like
fiduciary, the representataive may sue or defend on behalf of the minor or incompetent person.
Subject to subdivision (C) of this rule, if a minor or incompetent person does not have a duly
appointed representative he may sue by his next friend or defend by a guardian ad litem. When
a minor or incompetent person is not otherwise represented in an action the court shall appoint
a guardian ad litem or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of such
minor or incompetent person.
Id.
In addition, OHIO R. Civ. P. 17(A) states that "every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest." Id.
"'OHio R. Civ. P. 17(B).
I22[d.
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plex problems. A business entity doing business under a fictitious or trade name 2 3
cannot commence an action in the state of Ohio'24 until the entity has reported
the use of the fictitious or trade name to the Secretary of State'25 and complied
with the requirements of Ohio Revised Code section 1329.01(C). In addition,
partnerships that are using fictitious names must file a certificate naming the
partners and providing their addresses. This latter certificate must be filed with
the county recorder where the principal business office is located and where
the business owns real property.' 2, Ohio Revised Code sections 1329.10(C),
1329.01(C) and 1777.02 define the requirements for corporation and partner-
ship capacity, but the code sections do not explain the consequences if the cor-
poration or partnership does not have capacity at the time an action is attempted
to be commenced.
'"'Millare, Fictitious Name Reporting, 51 0. BAR 1003, 1003 (1978) states that "A fictitious name is a
business name used by someone which does not fully identify the owner-user, for example, Bill's Market.
The stated purpose of the code revision is to make it easier for the public to determine with whom it is
doing business and should aid those having legal complaints in identifying the proper party to designate
as the defendant when suit is brought."Id.
1"4OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1329.10(C) states that:
no person doing business under a trade name or fictitious name shall commence or maintain an
action in the trade name of fictitious name in any court in this state or on account of any contracts
made or transactions had in the trade name or fictitious name until it has first complied with Section
1329.01 of the Revised Code and, if the person is a partnership, it has complied with Section 1777.02
of the Revised Code, but upon compliance, such an action may be commenced or maintained on
any contracts and transactions entered into prior to compliance.
Id. at § 1329.02(C).
'"OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1329.01(C) states that:
any person who does business under a fictitious name, and who has not registered and does not
wish to register the fictitious name as a trade name or who cannot do so because the name is not
available for registration, shall report the use of the fictitious name to the secretary of state. The
secretary of state shall prescribe the forum for the report, which shall include the name and address
of the user, the nature of the business conducted, the exact form of the fictitious name used and,
if the user is a general partnership, the names and residence addresses of all the partners and, if
the user is a limited partnership, the name and residence address of the general partners. The secretary
of state shall give information concerning the identity of the user to anyone who inquires
concerning it.
All fictitious names in use at the time of the effective date of this section or for which use
is commenced beteween the effective date and December 31, 1978, shall be reported to the secretary
of state not later than January 1, 1979. Thereafter, all reports shall be made within thirty days
after the date of the first use of the fictitious name.
Id.
It should be pointed out that fewer difficulties are encountered when the corporation or partnership
that is using a trade or fictitious name is being sued. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1329.10(C) states that "an
action may be commenced or maintained against the user of a trade name or fictitious name whether
or not the name has been registered or reported in compliance with Section 1329.01 of the Revised Code."
Id. Although this section permits a defendent that is lacking capacity to sue, to be sued a question unanswered
still is the applicability of this section in situations where the defendant may counterclaim and is essentially
a plaintiff. Can the counterclaim be barred because of a lacking of capacity by a defendant?
"16 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1777.02 states that:
every partnership transacting business in this state under a fictitious name, or under a designation
not showing the names of the persons interested as partners therein, must file, with the clerk of
the court of common pleas of the county in which its principal office or place of business is situated
and of each county in which it owns real property, a certificate to be indexed by him, stating the
names in full of all the members of the partnership and their places of residence. The county auditor
shall not transfer and the county recorder shall not record any conveyance of real property to or
from any such partnership, unless such instrument is endorsed by the clerk of the court of common
pleas showing that such partnership has filed the certificate required by this section.
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What if one of these legal entities lacks the capacity to sue at the time when
it files the complaint, but acquires that capacity at some later date? Does a
cure to lack of capacity relate back to the date of filing for commencement
purposes, or does commencement occur as of the date of the cure? If the capacity
cure does not relate back, then the running of the statute of limitations for
a particular action may prevent a timely commencement of the action even
though the complaint was filed before the statute ran. In addition, since lack
of capacity is a quasi affirmative defense under Rule 9(A), does a waiver of
the defense result in commencement? If it does waive the defense, is this waiver
effective at the date on which the complaint was filed or at the date on which
the defense is wavied? And, how specific must the challenge to capacity be?
The case law, although split, appears to favor a capacity defect as being
a procedural defect and not a substantive one. The court has maintained a liberal
position in correcting a defect in capacity, whereas existence problems render
the case a nullity.
In Citizen's Loan and Savings Ass'n v. Krickenberger'" the court held
that the curing of capacity could occur after the action had commenced.
12
1
Although the defect in capacity concerned a partnership's necessity of filing
the partners names with the clerk of the court to have the statutory capacity
to sue, the court stated that the cure could occur after commencement. In this
case the court used "commencement" in a nontechnical sense rather than in
the technical sense of Rule 3(A). Therefore, the court indicated that a cure to
capacity can occur after "commencement," meaning the beginning of pro-
ceedings. Still, the court provided no clue as to whether the cure related back
to the proceedings that occurred prior to the curing of the defect.,29 It seems
1246 Ohio App. 228, 188 N.E. 396 (2nd Dist. 1932). On appeal in Goubeaux v. Krinkerberger, 126 Ohio
St. 302, 185 N.E. 201 (1933) the lower court's holding were affirmed holding that the organization was
a partnership.
"'In Citizen's Loan and Savings Ass'n v. Krickenberger, 46 Ohio App. 228, 118 N.E. 396 (2d Dist. 1932)
the court stated that:
the plaintiff, therefore, not being an individual, and admittedly not being a corporation, and being
an association for profit, we are of the opinion that the only status it could assume would be that
of a partnership. We are also of opinion that under Section 11260 of the General Code the plaintiff
as such partnership may maintain this action, and that a compliance with Section 8104, General
Code, may be had by the plaintiff after commencement of the action.
Id. at 398.
'"Id. at 396-98. In Goubeaux v. Krickenberger 126 Ohio St. 302, 185 N.E. 201, 202 (1933) the court affirmed
the lower court's decision in Citizen's. The court stated that "the common pleas court held that such
association was a partnership, and required the plaintiff association to cause a list of its depositors as
of the time of the filing of the suit to be filed in the office of the clerk of the courts before it should
become entitled to any judgment or decree in the case." Id. And the court added that "an appeal to the
Court of Appeals, which also held that the association was a partnership and required that the association
should cause the list of its members or depositors to be filed with the clerk preliminary to the recovery
of any judgment or decree in this cause against the original defendants." Id. In Cobble v. Farmer's Bank,
63 Ohio St. 528, 59 N.E. 221 (1900) the Ohio Supreme Court stated that "the judgment entered was no
judgment, as there was no party to the suit in whose favor a valid judgment could be rendered." Id. at
223. In the Cobble case creditors of the deceased claimed that a judgment on a cognovit note was invalid
since the partnership involved in the action had not appropriately filed a new certificate with the clerk
of the court providing the clerk with the changes in the names of the firm members. Without the filing
of the certificate, the partnership did not legally exist and the judgment on the note was reversed, since
the prior judgment could not be entered for a nonexistent party. Id.
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reasonable to assume that the cure did relate back since the court did not invali-
date any of the prior proceedings. This issue remains unclear in all of the cases
and can pose an important issue in statute of limitations situations.
In addition, Ritzler v. Eckleberry, 30 held that lack of capacity by the defen-
dant, a minor, could be cured "after the evidence [had] been taken and both
parties rested and before a verdict, finding or judgment [had] been entered.'" 31
The court stated that lacking any "showing that the interest of the minor was
harmed or damaged by the delay"' 32 the cure for the defect in capacity would
be allowed. Again, the case does not discuss how the cure of the defect in capacity
affected the issue of commencement. A reasonable interpretation would be that
the cure did relate back to cover all of the proceedings, since none of the pro-
ceedings were invalidated. 133
Although the above cases seem to indicate that a capacity defect can be
cured subsequent to the filing of a complaint and even at the trial, the rules
also point out that a challenge to capacity will be waived if not raised by the
parties. Specifically, Rule 9(A) states that:
It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or
the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or
the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made
a party. When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal existence
of any party or the capacity of any party a representative capacity, he
shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall include such
supporting particulars as are peculiarly with the pleader's knowledge.' 3
The rule is limited further by Rule 12(H) which states that all defenses and
objections are waived unless presented by motion, responsive pleading or
amendment. 35 In fact in Canterbury v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co., 116 lack of capacity
was deemed to be waived since it was not timely raised by appropriate defense.
And in Gove Associates, Inc. v. Thomas'37 the court was even more explicit
about the nature of the response challenging capacity. The court stated that
"the complaint argues that plaintiff never proved its corporate capacity to make
a contract or sue. The pleading burden was on the defendant to deny the plain-
tiffs capacity by specific negative averment. Civ.R. 9(B). The answer contained
111167 Ohio St. 439, 149 N.E.2d 728, 728 (1958). In the Ritzler case the guardian ad litem was appointed
prior to judgment. The court noted that "after the guardian ad litem filed his answer instanter, he asked
for no continuance." Id. at 732. The court was clear in stating that the defect of lack of capacity was
clearly procedural and that the failure of defendant's guardian ad litem to request a continuance was further
evidence that defendant minor had not been prejudiced in any way prior to the appointment of a guardian.Id.
"''Id. at 733.
13 Id.
133Id.
1 4 OHIo R. Civ. P. 9(A).
...OHio R. Civ. P. 12(H).
'158 Ohio St. 68, 107 N.E.2d 115, 115 (1952).
"'Gove. v. Thomas, 59 Ohio App. 2d 144, 392 N.E.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Dist. 1977).
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only a general denial. Consequently this objection was waived. Civ.R. 12(H)."' 38
However, the courts are not clear as to whether the waiver is effective on the
date that the defense was raised or effective as to the date the complaint was
filed. When the defense of lack of capacity is asserted the courts have been
clear in stating that the defense must be specific, and it cannot be employed
by a general denial.
One of the unanswered questions is how capacity relates to situations where
the statute of limitations is involved. It is reasonable to assume that the cure
to a defect in capacity relates back, given the courts position of considering
capacity as a procedural defect and leaving the proceedings to be unaffected
in cases where a cure to capacity has taken place. It is probably unlikely that
a cure in statute of limitations situations would not relate back, but this point
remains an issue to be decided by the courts. Additional support for the relating
back of the cure is found in Rule 17(A) that specifies a relation back in situa-
tions involving real parties in interest. Since capacity is discussed in subdivi-
sion (B) of the same rule it is reasonable to assume a similar relation back when
a defect in capacity occurs. When the issue of capacity and the relation back
factor are interposed with the statute of limitations problems the issue of the
curing of capacity becomes questionable. The courts have not addressed this
issue yet.
V. FAILURE OF COMMENCEMENT: THE FORGOTTEN DEFENSE
During the one year period, the one year grace period in which the com-
plainant is seeking to achieve service to commence the action, we refer to the
status of the law suit as one "attempted to be commenced."' 39 By definition
"'Id. In Walsh v. Thomas' Sons, 91 Ohio St. 211 (7th Dist. 1915) the defendant challenged the plaintiff
partnership as lacking capacity because the issue of capacity was not clearly incorporated in plaintiff's
complaint. The court stated that "this section of the statute [referring to § 8108 of the GENERAL CODE
superseded by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1777.02] does not, in terms, require that the petition [complaint]
must allege compliance with the registration acts." Id. at 213. The court's position in this early case was
that capacity did not require a specific averment in the complaint, although a defense of lack of capacity
could defeat the action. The court added that "noncompliance with the provisions relating to registration
is a defensive matter, may be interposed as such, and will defeat the action unless compliance with § 8099,
GENERAL CODE, be made during the progress of the cause. In this case, at the trial, the plaintiff did in fact
offer proof of proper registration." Id. at 214.
"'An action attempted to be commenced refers to that period between the filing of the complaint and
the achieving of service. Under the old Code, the sixty days attempt to commence period was equivalent
to commencement provided plaintiff diligently endeavored to achieve service and it was achieved within
the sixty days. Without service the cause was not commenced. Today, the provisions are the same except
that the attempt to commence period is one year. During this attempt to commence period several situations
may occur. For example, if the statute of limitations runs the action will not be commenced unless the
conditions of OHIO R. Civ. P. 15(C) amendment are met. Obviously the statute of limitations can bar the
action if the statute runs prior to the filing of the complaint. Likewise, if the statute of limitations runs
subsequently to the filing of the complaint and service is not achieved within one year following the filing
of the complaint, the statute can bar the action, unless conditions are found to meet Rule 15(C). Again,
it should be noted that the statute of limitations defense will bar the action if timely asserted by the
respondent, otherwise it will be waived.
This waiver feature was explicitly pointed out in Mills v. Whitehouse Trucking Co., 40 Ohio St. 2d
55, 320 N.E.2d 668, 671 (1974) which stated that:
a clear distinction exists in the Civil Rules between the affirmative defense of the bar of the statute
of limitations pursuant to Civ. R. 8(C), and a Civ. R. 12(b)(6) defense. The purpose behind the
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of the rule, the claim is not an action during this "attempt to commence period,"
it is a claim attempting to become an action. This prolonged period of existence
for the law suit does not continue ad infinitum. It will be ended in one of two
ways, either by valid and effective service or by the running of the one year
period of time. '40 If valid and effective service is achieved the law suit is com-
menced, but if service is not achieved we have a different situation - one that
is more perplexing and more difficult to deal with.
What is the situation if service is not achieved within the one year period
specified by the rule? The rule defines the requirements for commencement
but it does not explicitly delineate the consequences if the requirements for com-
mencement are not met. Logically, we can conclude that if service culminates
in a commencement of the action, then a lack of service must culminate in a
noncommencement or a "failure of commencement" of the law suit. The courts
have reached a similar conclusion. For example, in Kossuth v. Bear'4' the court
stated that "for lack of service, no case came into existence." 14 2 Therefore,
if the law suit was not commenced it must be concluded that it did not come
into existence. Therefore, a failure to meet the jurisdictional requirements set
forth in Rule 3(A) must lead to a "failure to commence" situation.'43
In most cases, the circumstances that give rise to a failure to commence
are the very same circumstances that give rise to the defense of lack of jurisdic-
allowance of a Civ. R. 12(B) motion to dismiss based upon the statute of limitations is to avoid
the unnecessary delay involved in raising the bar of the statute in a responsive pleading when it
is clear on the face of the complaint that the cause of action is barred. The allowance of a Civ.
R. 12(B) motion serves merely as a method for expeditiously raising the statute of limitations defense.
If the bar of the statute is not raised either by motion before pleading or affirmatively in a responsive
pleading, or by amendment mode under Civ. R. 15, then the defense is waived under Civ. R. 12(H),
as are all other affirmative defenses which a party may present.
Id.
Also, refer to Browne, Ohio Civil Rule 8(C) And Related Rules 27 CLEVELAND STATE L. REV. 331,
363 (1978). Also, the confusion on the definition of the attempt to commence period is seen in Howard
v. Allen, 28 Ohio App. 2d 275, 193 N.E.2d 186, 188 (1971) which states that:
statute, R.C. 2305.17 was amended in 1965 to delete the definition of 'attempted commencement,'
and modified the definition of 'commencement' to essentially the same definition as contained in
Civil Rule 3(A). There is now no definition of what constitutes an action attempted to be commenced
within the meaning of R.C. 2305.19 set forth either by statute or civil rule - unless it can be held
that the definition, of an attempt to commence an action, of former R.C. 2305.17 continues to
define the terms as used in R.C. 2305.19, it would appear that the good faith filing of a complaint
followed by service within one year from such filing, which service is later determined to be ineffective,
would constitute an attempt to commence the action within the meaning of R.C. 2305.19.
Id.
"In Conway v. Smith, 66 Ohio App. 2d 65, 419 N.E.2d 1117, 1119 (8th Dist. 1979) the court stated that:
appellants did not obtain service until February 23, 1978, fully one year, eight and one half months
after filing their complaint (the complaint was filed one day before the statute of limitations ran).
The action, therefore, was never commenced within the meaning of the Civil Rule or R.C. Chapter
2305, either within the two year period after the accident or the one year savings clause of Civ. R. 3(A).
Id.
This point is made in Lash v. Miller, 50 Ohio St. 2d 631, 362 N.E.2d 642 (1977), Yancey v. Pyles,
44 Ohio App. 2d 410, 339 N.E.2d 835 (1st Dist. 1975), Mason v. Waters, 6 Ohio St. 2d 212, 217 N.E.2d
213 (1966), and Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285 (1954).
111161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285, 285 (1954).
1'2Id. at 288.
'
3Yancy v. Pyles, 44 Ohio App. 2d 410, 339 N.E.2d 835 (1st Dist. 1975).
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tion. In both situations the respondent is either served an invalid summons,
is served ineffectively or, perhaps, is not served a summons at all. If the respon-
dent is not served, or is invalidly or ineffectively served, the court does not
have jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and likewise the law suit
is not commenced. " ' This similarity of the circumstances leads to a natural
tendency to use similar responses in addressing either of the situations. But
respondent's decision to respond with the most apparent defense may be a
fatal flaw.
The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is easily
recognizable, is specified by the rules and is well known. In addition, it appears
logically applicable to the situation because of the similarity of circumstances.
Since lack of jurisdiction is a visible rules defense, as Rule 12(B),14 ' and the
defense of failure to commence is not, the latter defense, failure to commence,
is overshadowed by Rule 12(B)(2) and becomes the "forgotten defense." ' 14 6 But
lack of jurisdiction, Rule 12(B)(2), is not the most effective defense for a failure
to commence situation. 147
For example, when the Rule 12(B)(2) defense of lack of jurisdiction, over
the person of the defendant is used it is asserted mainly by a motion to dismiss
which in turn culminates in the involuntary dismissal specified by Rule
41(B)(4).'14 But to dismiss the case the court must act to decide the motion to
dismiss, and in acting the court is providing evidence of the existence of the law
suite. 49 If the lawsuit exists it obviously has been commenced. The responses
1"'Supra note 228. Two recent cases that have held otherwise are St. Thomas Hospital v. Beal, No. 10078
(Summit County, filed July 22, 1981), reprinted in 54 OHlO BAR 2182 (1982):
[t]he issue in this case is whether Civ. R. 3(A) requires that a complaint be dismissed when service
is not obtained upon the defendant within one year of filing. 'If service is obtained within one
year of filing, then that case is commenced on the date of filing for purposes of the statute of
limitations. However, where service is obtained more than one year after the filing of the complaint,
then the case is deemed commenced on the date of service.' As long as the case is commenced within
the applicable statute of limitations it may not be dismissed.
Id. 2182.
And, Scott v. Orlando, No. L-81-030 (Lucas County, filed July 31, 1981) reprinted in 55 OHIo BAR
131 (1982):
[p]laintiffs appeal from the judgement dismissing their complaint for failure to obtain service within
one year after the filing of the complaint, held: reversed. Plaintiffs timely filed the praecipe for
service, but the clerk delay issuing a summons for service. '[A] cause of action will not be barred
by failure to obtain service within' the time prescribed by R.C. 2305.17 and Civ. R. 3(A) 'when
such failure is caused by unreasonable delay attributable to the clerk of courts or the court itself.'
Id. 131.
.. 'OHIO R. Civ. P. 12(B)(2).
14'Browne, Ohio Civil Rule 8(C) and Related Rules, 27 CLEVELAND STATE L. REV. 331, 362-63 (1978).
"'Id. at 364, n.112.
M'OHio R. Civ. P. 41(B)(4) states that "a dismissal (a) for lack of jurisdiction over the person or the subject
matter, or (b) for failure to join a party under Rule 19 or Rule 19.1 shall operate as a failure otherwise
than on the merits."
And, in Jurko v. Jobs Europe Agency, 40 Ohio App. 2d 79, 334 N.E.2d 478, 483 (8th Dist. 1975)
the court stated that "a successful Rule 12(B)(2) motion will normally result in an order dismissing the
action, but should not prejudice the plaintiff's action on the merits and his right to either seek leave to
amend his complaint or to file another complaint." Id.
"'In Siegfried v. Railroad Co., 50 Ohio St. 294, 34 N.E. 331 (1893) the court stated that the issue concerned
whether or not plaintiff's action failed. If it failed he invoked the one year savings clause and if he did
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of the defendant and the court present interesting implications for the parties
that are attempting to commence this action. The respondent's Rule 12(B)(2)
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant waives
the defense of failure to commence. 5 ' There can be no failure to commence
when one is requesting the court to dismiss an action. Therefore, the respon-
dent, in moving to dismiss waives the failure to commence and is barred from
any further consideration of using the failure to commence defense. In addi-
tion, the court's action on the motion to dismiss is an involuntary dismissal,
and is explicitly defined by Rule 41(B)(4) as a "failure otherwise than on the
merits." 51 Therefore, the dismissal itself further substantiates the court's recogni-
tion of the existence of the action. Since it is illogical to assume that a non-
commenced lawsuit can be dismissed, it must be concluded to have been
commenced. Given that the dismissal embellishes the law suit with existence,
an additional set of circumstances develops as a consequence of the dismissal.
Under the provisions of the Savings Statute,' 52 the complainant will be
granted an additional year beyond the date of the court's dismissal, to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.'53 The grace period of Ohio Revised
Code section 2305.19 is designed as a remedial provision to provide a diligent
complainant with a one year grace period beyond the statute of limitations that
may have run for an action so as to recommence the action.' 4 Respondent's
not fail, further action was barred. A voluntary dismissal is not a failure. But the court added that "to
fail implied an effort or purpose to succeed. One cannot properly be said to fail in anything he does not
undertake, nor in an undertaking which he voluntarily abandons." Id. at 332. In addition, the court stated
that... "a failure in the action, by the plaintiff, otherwise than upon the merits, imports some action
by the court by which the plaintiff is defeated without a trial upon the merits . . . (a) dismissal by the
plaintiff involves no action of the court." Id at 332.
"'It is reasonable to apply OHIO R. Civ. P. 12(B)(2) to the common law defense of failure to commence
when speaking of a waiver of these defenses. For example, in Bogar v. Ujlaki, 4 F.R.D. 352, 353 (Civ.
An. No. 3050, District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania) (1945) the court stated that:
in his original answer, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint without mentioning the defense
set out (later) in his amendment. He voluntarily appeared, answered to the merits, and not until
five months later (and then without leave of court) did he file his objection to the service of process.
By his original answer and delay in amendment, he had waived his right to assert lack of jurisdiction
(or in our case failure to commence).
It has long been recognized, however, that the filing of an answer to the merits involves an
appearance in the action for all purposes ...
Id.
.. OHIo R. Civ. P. 41(B)(4). Also, Dicello v. Palmer, No. 79AP-402 (Franklin County, filed February 12,
1980).
"'OHIo REv. CODE ANN., § 2309.19. Also, In The Matter of Johnson, No. 80AP-584 (Franklin County, filed
February 24, 1981).
,,31d.
11'In Bush v. Cole, 1 Ohio App. 269, 271 (1lth Dist. 1913) the court stated that:
this question was squarely before the supreme court of Kansas under a statute like our own in the
case of Denton v. Atchison, 76 Kans. 89. The court in the opinion says 'the general periods of
limitations are not changed by this provision, but it is intended to give a party who within the proper
time brought an action which was disposed of otherwise than upon the merits after the statue of
limitations had run a year of grace in which to reinstate his case and obtain a determination upon
the merits. It is a substitute for the common law rule of journeys account, in which a plaintiff
whose writ was abated for some matter of form which did not go to the merits might have a new
writ within a reasonable time, computed by the number of days which the plaintiff must spend
in journeying to reach the court. Under the rule of our statute, if the dismissal occurs after the
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selection of the Rule 12(B)(2) defense of lack of jurisdiction has set into motion
the crucial vehicle for the complainant to resurface the law suit after the dismissal,
and to be granted an extra year to commence the action.
Still, knowing the above problems that can arise from incorrectly utilizing
the Rule 12(B)(2) motion of lack of jurisdiction, does not provide the respon-
dent with a "model" for responding correctly to the failure to commence situa-
tion. How can the defendant respond and avoid the consequences of the Rule
41(B)(4) dismissal and the Savings Statute?' 5
The "model" for responding is found in the effective use of the common
law defense of failure to commence, the forgotten defense. But the effective
use of this defense is dependent on other factors.' 56 The failure to commence
situation will not arise until the Rule 3(A) year has run, unless the defect is
incurable and the court will never acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. 57 Since the defense cannot arise until the year has ended, it must
be used in conjunction with other, then available defenses.' But how is the
defense of failure to commence used with other defenses?
The form of the "model" response is to plead a failure to commence defense
as an affirmative defense under the provisions of Rule 8(C).'" Although failure
to commence is not specifically identified as an affirmative defense it is logical
to conclude that is must be one since it cannot be an implied from a mere denial
of the claim. 6 ' If pleaded as an affirmative defense it is imperative to plead
it with the other affirmative defenses then available.' 6' Therefore, the defense
of failure to commence must be pleaded with the Rule 12(B)(2) defense of lack
of jurisdiction and if appropriate the Rule 12(B)(4) defense of insufficiency of
process and the 12(B)(5) defense of insufficiency of service of process.' 62
time limit has expired the plaintiff has one year from that dismissal to bring a new action to get
the benefit of this extension two things are essential: first, the action must have been commenced
within due time; and, second, there must have been a failure otherwise than upon the merits after
the general limitations of time had expired.'
Id. at 171-72 (affirmed 91 Ohio St. 369, 110 N.E. 1056 (1914)).
This point is made also in Browne, Ohio Civil Rule 8(C) and Related Rules, 27 CLEVELAND STATE
L. REv. 336 n.114 (1978).
.'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19. Of course, this assumes that the respondent choses to answer and not
to use an objection or a motion.
"'Browne, Ohio Civil Rule 8(C) and Related Rules, 27 CLEVELAND STATE L. REV. 361-66 (1978).
"71d.
"'OHIo R. Civ. P. 12(G) states that:
a party who makes a motion under this rule must join with it the other motions herein provided
for and then available to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be raised by motion,
he shall not thereafter assert by motion or responsive pleading, any of the defenses or objections
so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (H) of this rule.
'"OHIO R. Civ. P. 8(C).
"It cannot be a denial since it was not a claim asserted by the complainant. OHIO R. Civ. P. 8(B).
"'OHIO R. CIv. P. 12(G).
"'fOHIO R. Clv. P. 12(H).
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Therefore, the responsive pleading will include the Rule 12(B)(2) defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the common law defense
of failure of commencement, and the Rule 12(B)(4) defense of insufficiency
of process or the Rule 12(B)(5) defense of insufficiency of service of process
if applicable.
But the pleading of these defenses is only the first step in the implementa-
tion of the "model" response. When all pleadings have been entered, 163 and
when the year for acquiring jurisdiction has expired the second step to be taken
by the respondent is to move for a preliminary hearing under Rule 12(D).
164
Once the motion is heard and judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant,
finding a lack of jurisdiction, the respondent may then move to strike the com-
plaint from the files' 65 for failure to commence. This latter step is crucial and
easily overlooked. But if the respondent uses a motion to strike the complaint
instead of the motion to dismiss this separate motion has more favorable con-
sequences for the respondents.
The motion to strike the complaint from the files for failure to commence
does exactly what it purports to do. It strikes the complaint from the files, as
if it did not exist. 166 And, if the lawsuit did not exist when the action is terminated
and the statute of limitations has run for that particular action, any further
action is effectively barred. Since the complaint is striken from the files it is
not a dismissal and, therefore, if it is not a dismissal it cannot be a failure other-
wise than on the merits and, consequently, it cannot invoke the Savings Statute. 
67
"'OHio R. Civ. P. 12(D) states that "the defenses specifically enumerated (1) to (7) in subdivision (B) of
this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision
(C) of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party." Id.
'6'Id.
"'OHio R. Civ. Pro. Staff Note to Rule 12. Historically, the 1853 Code of Civil Procedure did not include
the methods for asserting the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the person. Therefore, the profession itself
invented "the motion to quash or set aside summons, service or return as the normal methods for asserting
these defenses." Id. at 66. But it also appears probable that the framers of the 1853 Code did intend that
all defenses were to be asserted in the answer, unless raised by demurrer. Id. Therefore, a respondent
with a decisive defense would most likely not desire to defend by an answer waiting until the trial to prove
the defense, but would prefer to utilize an unauthorized procedure, such as, a motion to dismiss, or a
motion to strike for failure to commence. Id. This unauthorized approach would enable the defendant
to reach a favorable judgment before the trial. Id. It is logical to conclude that the common law motion
to strike for failure to commence was derived because of similar conditions.
"'Browne, Ohio Civil Rule 8(C) and Related Rules, 27 CLEVELAND STATE L. REV. 331, 360-66 (1978).
1171n Mason v. Water, 6 Ohio St. 2d 212, 217 N.E.2d 213, 213 (1966) the plaintiff served the defendant
in the wrong county. "Defendant then filed an answer to plaintiff's petition, in which he sets forth, as
a first defense, that the court lacked jurisdiction of his person and, as a second defense, that the action
was not brought within the time limited for the commencement of such actions and was, therefore barred."
Id. at 215. The trial court held for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. On appeal the court stated that:
Section 2305.17 (Rule 3(A)) provides that an action shall be deemed commenced on the date of
the summons which is served on defendant. This contemplates an effective service of summons,
which, in this case, was not obtained until September 26, 1963 (accident arose February 22, 1959
and it was a personal injury subject to a two-year statute of limitations). Since there was no effective
service prior to that date, no action was commenced, nor was there an attempt to commence an
action equivalent to its commencement within the meaning of Section 2305.17. Id. at 216. The court
added that "from a reading of that statute [2305.19] it appears that in order for an action to fail
otherwise than on the merits, that action must first be commenced or attempted to be commenced."
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So the motion to strike the complaint from the files for failure to commence
becomes the more favorable defense it utilized effectively. But the realities of
its presence as a common law defense, rather than a rules defense, makes it
likely that it will continue to be forgotten.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ohio's Rule 3(A), although simply stated in one brief sentence, is far from
simple in application. An understanding of the historical context of Rule 3(A)
and the language of the rule provide the necessary basis for an analysis and
interpretation of the major problems related to Rule 3(A). The case law that
is related to Rule 3(A) is complex and confusing unless it is placed in the historical
milieu of the rule. Likewise, the interpretation of the rule extends beyond the
mere language of the rule, and it is the case law as well as the civil rules that
provide the actual interpretation for the rule. An understanding of this
framework provided by the history and the interpretations of the language of
the rule must precede any meaningful analysis and subsequent understanding
of Rule 3(A).
Beyond the problems inherent in the history and the language of the rule
are the unstated, major problems of existence and capacity that must be con-
sidered when using the rule since their absence can be fatal for the commence-
ment of the law suit. And, likewise, the forgotten common law defense of failiure
to commence is truly forgotten and, yet, it presents the most effective defense
to be utilized with Rule 3(A). The is time to reexamine the simplicity of the
language of Rule 3(A) to determine if the language facilitates or hinders the
judicial process.
Id.
In Hoehn v. Empire Steel Co., 172 Ohio St. 285, 175 N.E.2d 172, 172 (1961) the court stated that
the action was never commenced "to the point where the court had any jurisdiction over the defendant.
Therefore, the plaintiff cannot be said to have failed otherwise than upon the merits." Id.
And, in Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285, 285 (1954) the court stated that:
as to the petition which was filed in Lorain county on May 29, 1950 [one day before the expiration
of two years from the date of the accident], there was no service of summons. Therfore, it cannot
be said that an action was even deemed to be commenced in Lorain county. In other words,
notwithstanding the filing of the petition and issuance of summons, no case ever mature in Lorain
county to the point where the court had any jurisdiction over the defendant or had any power to
make any order based upon the allegations of the petitions so filed. There was no pending case
to be 'dismissed.'
Id. at 288.
The court explained that "what the court did was to strike the petition from the files." Id. And,
the court added that "it seems axiomatic that a nonexistent case can not be dismissed." Id.
[Vol. 16:2
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 16 [1983], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol16/iss2/4
